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Abstract 
In this paper we use the unusually large sample size of the Great British Class Survey to 
compare rates of social mobility into different elite occupations. We find a distinction 
between ‘traditional’ professions, such as law, medicine and finance, which are dominated 
by the children of higher managers and professionals, and technical or emerging high-
status occupations, particularly those related to IT,  that appear to recruit more widely. 
Second, we find that even when the upwardly mobile are successful in entering elite 
occupations they invariably fail to accumulate the same economic, cultural and social 
capital as those from privileged backgrounds. While many such differences may be 
explained by inheritance, we also find that the mobile tend to have considerably lower 
incomes. Investigating this further we demonstrate that even when controlling for 
important variables such as schooling, education, location, age, and cultural and social 
capital, the upwardly mobile in eight occupations – located largely in the business sector - 
have considerably lower incomes than their higher-origin colleagues. These findings 
underline the value of analyses of mobility into specific high-status occupations as well as 
illustrating how, beyond entry, the mobile often face considerable disadvantage within 
occupations. 
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Introduction 
Social mobility currently stands at the very nexus of the British political agenda. According 
to the Coalition Government, improving mobility is the ‘principal goal’ of current social 
policy (Cabinet Office, 2011: 5). Much of this attention has focused on social mobility into 
Britain’s elite occupations. In particular, there has long been a perception that Britain’s 
traditionally high-status professional arenas, such as law, medicine, engineering and 
journalism, remain stubbornly elitist and recruit largely those who have been privately 
educated or who hail from privileged class backgrounds (Milburn, 2009; 2012; 2014). 
Indeed a recent historical study of surname persistence amongst Oxbridge graduates and 
holders of top positions since the 13thcentury claims that social status in Britain is more 
strongly inherited than height (Clark and Cummins 2013, Clark 2014). As Prime Minister 
David Cameron noted in a recent speech, ‘You only have to look at the make-up of the 
high-levels of parliament, the judiciary, the army, the media. It’s not diverse; there’s not 
as much social mobility as there needs to be’ (Cameron, 2014).  
 
In British sociology, there is a long and rich tradition of research looking at mobility into 
elite occupations (e.g. Glass ed., 1954). Razzel, 1963, Halsey and Crewe, 1969; Boyd, 1973; 
Stanworth and Giddens, 1974; Heath, 1981). However, in recent decades, this line of 
enquiry has died a curious death. In large part this is because debates have become 
fixated on either the measurement of mobility - with economists focusing on income and 
sociologists favoring occupational class – or, flowing from this, heated disagreement over 
generalised rates of mobility and how best to interpret them. Moreover when sociologists 
have sought to study mobility into top occupations, they have mostly done so using the 
‘big classes’ of the National Statistics Socio-economic Classification (NS-SEC) 1.1 (‘large 
employers and higher managerial and administrative occupations’ and 1.2 (‘higher 
professional occupations’). We thus know a great deal about mobility into these large 
categories of occupations, but little about differences between the individual occupations 
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that comprise NS-SEC 1. For example, is it less difficult for the children of manual workers 
to become doctors, or lawyers, or business executives?   
 
Further, for all the emphasis on occupational mobility, we know relatively little about how 
successful the upwardly mobile are within occupations. The emphasis on rates of upward 
mobility, for example, has often carried with it the implication that entry into elite 
occupations is the end point of a person’s mobility trajectory.  Sociologists have rarely 
considered, therefore, how the mobile progress intra-occupationally; in other words, 
whether they reach the same levels of seniority, prestige or income as those from more 
privileged backgrounds.  
 
We have a unique opportunity to begin addressing these underexplored areas by using 
data from the first wave of the BBC Great British Class Survey (GBCS) (n=161,400). While 
the self-selecting nature of the GBCS web survey resulted in substantial skews, the groups 
that are overrepresented are precisely those in which we are most interested: the highly-
educated, occupationally successful and economically well-off.  The GBCS thus provides an 
unrivalled opportunity to mine down and explore the internal composition of NS-SEC 1 
and other high-status occupational categories. Drawing on the unusually large sample of 
these occupations (N = 40,077), we address two main research questions. First, we ask 
whether upward mobility is more common in some elite occupations than others? 
Second, we look at whether those who have been upwardly mobile into elite occupations 
are significantly different from those who are intergenerationally stable within them. 
More specifically, we ask – is there any evidence that a ‘class ceiling1’ may prevent the 
mobile from achieving the very highest levels of economic, social and cultural capital?  
 
Social Mobility in Contemporary Britain 
                                                          
1
 Since the term ‘glass ceiling’ normally refers to the unseen barrier preventing ethnic minorities and women 
from reaching the top of elite occupations, we choose ‘class ceiling’ here to specify the process in terms of 
upwardly mobility. 
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Over the last 20 years the goal of increasing social mobility has become one of the rare 
points of convergence among the UK’s major political parties (Payne, 2012). This was 
underlined in 2010 with the setup of the Social Mobility and Child Poverty Commission, in 
2011 with the establishment of the flagship Coalition strategy ‘Opening Doors, Breaking 
Barriers’  (Cabinet Office, 2011), and again recently with the  ‘State of the Nation Report’ 
(2013) which reiterated the Government’s commitment to increasing social mobility. At 
the root of these commitments is a widely-held anxiety that social mobility is declining in 
the UK. This policy focus has been fuelled by the work of a group of high-profile 
economists (Blanden et al, 2004; 2005; 2007) whose research has pointed to a decrease in 
intergenerational upward income mobility. Drawing on data from the 1958 National 
Child Development Study (NCDS) and the 1970 British Cohort Study (BCS70), Blanden et al 
(2004; 2005) have found that income mobility has fallen for those sons born in 1970 
compared with those born in 1958. However, these findings have been strongly disputed 
by some sociologists (Goldthorpe and Jackson, 2007; Goldthorpe and Mills, 2008; 
Goldthorpe, 2013). These authors stress the importance of measuring upward mobility in 
terms of occupational class rather than income, and using this approach find that absolute 
and relative mobility rates have stayed fairly constant over the same period. 
  
While this heated debate over rates of mobility remains central, it is also restrictive. In 
particular, the focus has remained fixated on general aggregate rates of mobility (or 
inflow and outflow rates into the 7 main NS-SEC categories) rather than examining how 
rates of mobility vary among smaller groups, such as specific elite occupations. This more 
focused approach did historically play a central role in British mobility studies (Halsey and 
Crewe, 1969; Boyd, 1973; Heath, 1981).  However, because it focused largely on the 
‘inflow’ to specific occupational groups, it was subject to the same criticisms that John 
Goldthorpe and the ‘class structural’ school effectively posed to the ‘status-attainment’ 
approaches which had been dominant within American mobility studies inspired by Blau 
and Duncan (see the general discussion in Savage 1997).   
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Goldthorpe’s objection was that by focusing on the correlates of ‘who gets ahead’ through 
looking at those in ‘high status’ occupations, the status attainment approach failed to 
place elite mobility within  the context of broader structural shifts in the class structure, 
particularly the post-war expansion of professional and managerial jobs.  Goldthorpe’s 
critique was rightly influential but the result was to ‘throw the baby out with the 
bathwater’. Whilst it is inadequate to examine what kinds of people move into high status 
occupations as if this is the only, or even main, task for social mobility research, we 
contend that this nonetheless remains an important question to explore empirically. 
Furthermore, Goldthorpe’s class structural perspective placed the emphasis on flows 
between ‘big classes’ and thus forfeited the more minute and specific analyses of mobility 
into particular occupations which was present in older traditions of research.  
 
More recently, the question of how to locate occupations within class analysis and the 
study of social mobility has been taken up by Grusky and his various collaborators (e.g. 
Grusky and Sorensen 1998, Grusky and Weeden 2002), who argue that in the process of 
aggregation to NS-SEC-type classes, the detailed dynamics of occupational contexts - in 
respect of class identities and relations - are underspecified. In turn, occupations whose 
work and market situations, entry requirements and recruitment structures are very 
different, are then problematically classified together (Savage et al 1992). 
 
Combining Durkheimian and Marxian perspectives in arguing against this nominalist grain, 
Grusky and Sorensen (1998) make ‘the realist claim that occupations are often 
gemeinschaftlich communities as well as positional sources of exploitation and inequality’. 
It is thus at the localized level of disaggregated occupational groups, which are often 
deeply embedded in society, that the key processes of class formation – social closure and 
reproduction, identification and awareness, collective mobilization and exploitation - can 
most clearly be seen to emerge. Drawing on US surveys with large sample sizes, these 
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authors demonstrate that distinctive differences in mobility exist between occupational 
groups, which they argue should subsequently be understood as ‘microclasses’ (Grusky 
and Weeden 2001, 2008; Weeden and Grusky 2005; 2012).  
 
This illuminating US-based research has not been matched in the UK.  While in the past 
there has been much important work on processes of social closure within a polysemically 
defined ‘British Elite’ (Stanworth and Giddens, 1974; Parkin, 1979), and indeed there 
continues to be a focus on elite groups such as the ‘super-rich’ (Majima and Warde, 2008), 
the ‘top 1% of earners’ (Dorling, 2012), the ‘Establishment’ (Jones, 2014), and the ‘cultural 
elite’ (Griffiths et al, 2008), it is striking that not since Anthony Heath’s Social Mobility, 
published in 1981, has a sociological study of British intergenerational mobility reported 
mobility rates into particular elite occupations. In this way, the skew of the GBCS presents 
an unprecedented opportunity to examine patterns within these sociologically significant 
but smaller microclasses and investigate whether mobility is more or less restricted in 
certain occupations than others.       
 
A Class Ceiling? 
Another byproduct of the dominant focus on mobility rates is that it arguably reduces the 
concept of social mobility to a one-dimensional measure of occupational entry that tells us 
little about the intra-occupational dimensions of social mobility. Thus while many 
upwardly mobile individuals may secure admission into elite occupations, this does not 
mean they will have the same levels of success as those from more privileged 
backgrounds.  
 
Indeed, a number of studies suggest that even when individuals do experience upward 
mobility they rarely reach the very top. This is particularly evident in research that focuses 
on forms of economic, social and cultural capital, rather than occupational class.  For 
example, Li et al (2008) find that those who are upwardly mobile into the service class 
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have lower levels of both ‘bonding’ and ‘bridging’ social capital than those born into this 
class. The intergenerationally stable have higher status social contacts, their contacts span 
a larger status distance, they are more involved in civic associations, and they have higher 
levels of social trust. Similarly, a number of studies (Daenekindt and Roose, 2011; 
Friedman, 2012) have highlighted how the upwardly mobile frequently have less cultural 
capital than those born into privileged backgrounds, particularly in terms of the legitimacy 
of their cultural tastes. Elsewhere in Europe (Hartmann, 2000; Flemmen, 2012), there 
have also studies of the ways lack of access to different capitals can work in tandem 
against the upwardly mobile. Looking at the Norwegian ‘Upper Class’, for example, 
Flemmen finds that the volume of transmitted or inherited capital is the ‘key line of 
division’ within the group. While those with higher origins occupy the loftiest positions in 
social space, those who have been upwardly mobile tend to have much lower levels of 
both economic wealth and cultural capital.         
 
These studies all point to the way in which the inheritance of economic, cultural and social 
capital advantages the intergenerationally stable within elite occupations. Furthermore, 
Blanden, Gregg and Macmillan’s (2007) work on income mobility in Britain has repeatedly 
illustrated how those who are upwardly mobile from poorer backgrounds infrequently 
earn the very highest incomes. Yet while these studies on mobility and capitals are 
certainly illuminating, they tend to be small, based outside the UK, or focus on only one 
form of capital rather than the relationship between all three. In this regard, again, the 
detailed measures on economic, cultural and social capital in the GBCS represent a useful 
resource. Thus the second research question this article aims to address is: in what ways 
are the upwardly mobile different from the stable within British elite occupations? Are 
they less likely to acquire the very highest levels of economic, social and cultural capital 
and, if so, is this because they face a class ceiling?  
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The GBCS and an outline of the research    
As explained in the introduction to this special issue, the data we analyse here comes from 
the Great British Class Survey. Here we examine those in elite occupations within the 
GBCS. While the polysemic nature of the term ‘elite’ makes it difficult to define a set of 
uncontested ‘elite occupations’, we primarily draw on the guidance of Rose (2013) who 
argues the best existing measure is provided by Class 1 of the National Statistics socio-
Economic Classification (NS-SEC). We also include other high-status occupations routinely 
associated in policy discourse with the British elite but not included in NS-SEC 1, such as 
journalists (Milburn, 2014) as well as occupations closely associated with groups included 
in NS-SEC 1. For example, although ‘production and process engineers’ are officially 
classed as NS-SEC 2 we include them here as constituents within the wider, NS-SEC 1 
occupational group of ‘engineers’.  Moreover, as we are primarily interested in mobility 
into elite occupations, we also remove all those under 22 and in full-time education from 
our analyses, as these respondents are unlikely to have transitioned into stable 
occupational pathways2. This leaves a sample of 40,077 respondents in 15 elite 
occupational groupings. 
As noted earlier, the GBCS survey is not by any means a representative sample of Britain’s 
elite occupations. For example, respondents in NS-SEC 1 make up 35% of the GBCS 
sample, whereas the figure is 11.7% in the follow-up Gfk survey and 10.3% according to 
the Office for National Statistics in April 2011 (ONS, 2012). In order to get a sense of how 
GBCS respondents in elite occupations do or do not differ from their counterparts in the 
general population, we compare our sample with the nationally representative Labour 
Force Survey (LFS)3.   
                                                          
2
 We use 22 as a cut-off age as the majority of students in the UK will have finished undergraduate study by 
this age. 
3
 We refer to the Jan– April 2011 wave of LFS (N =105,199) because it matches the time period of the first 
wave of the GBCS. 
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Table 1A indicates the proportions of respondents in both surveys who are employed in 
each of our elite occupational groups. There are some striking micro-skews here. CEOs, for 
example, make up over 4% of all GBCS respondents, but only 0.14% of LFS respondents. 
Scientists, IT Professionals and journalists are also considerably over-represented. Indeed 
no elite occupation is underrepresented in the GBCS compared to the general population. 
The proportion of particular jobs within our elite occupational group is also different from 
the same elite occupational group within the LFS. Financial intermediaries represent a 
smaller proportion of our elite occupational group than they do in the LFS, for example, 
whereas CEOs remain significantly over-represented.  
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Table 1A: Distribution of Elite Occupations in GBCS and LFS   
 
All respondents over 
age 22, not students 
Respondents in elite occupations 
(over 22, not students) 
  
 
LFS  GBCS LFS GBCS GBCS N 
  scientists 0.35% 2.01% 3.3% 5.0% 1,991 
  engineers 0.92% 2.69% 7.8% 6.7% 2,668 
  IT professionals 1.84% 7.75% 15.3% 19.1% 7,672 
  doctors 0.49% 1.44% 4.5% 3.6% 1,426 
  other medical professionals 0.32% 0.74% 2.9% 1.8% 734 
  higher education teachers 0.22% 0.72% 2.3% 1.8% 713 
  education professionals 0.28% 1.42% 2.4% 3.5% 1,401 
  lawyers, barristers, judges 0.42% 1.95% 3.5% 4.8% 1,929 
  public sector (outside health) 0.26% 0.75% 2.4% 1.9% 747 
  accountants 0.48% 1.27% 4.3% 3.1% 1,261 
  CEOs, directors, presidents 0.14% 4.36% 1.1% 10.8% 4,319 
  other senior business 3.74% 9.84% 31.4% 24.3% 9,746 
  financial intermediaries 1.03% 1.97% 8.7% 4.9% 1,954 
  journalists 0.14% 1.15% 1.1% 2.8% 1,134 
  other ns-sec 1 occupations 1.06% 2.41% 9.0% 5.9% 2,382 
  total percent in elite 
occupations 11.7% 40.48% 100.0% 100.0% 
   Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
0.885 
 
0.880 
   total N 71615 99008 7859 40,077 
   
        
 
Table 1B: Demographic Characteristics in 2 surveys 
 
 
Percent White Percent Female Average Age 
 
 
LFS GBCS LFS GBCS LFS GBCS 
 scientists 89.3% 92.0% 40.1% 43.3% 41.7 36.1 
 engineers 91.9% 91.2% 6.6% 14.4% 43.7 37.2 
 IT professionals 84.7% 91.0% 15.2% 18.6% 39.7 38.3 
 doctors 70.7% 81.4% 39.8% 38.7% 42.4 36.9 
 other medical professionals 72.9% 86.8% 59.3% 60.2% 40.3 38.0 
 higher education teachers 87.7% 92.4% 44.4% 40.7% 49.6 45.2 
 education professionals 92.9% 95.1% 62.9% 51.5% 47.4 44.5 
 lawyers, barristers, judges 89.0% 88.6% 46.8% 42.6% 42.5 34.3 
 public sector (outside health) 91.3% 93.0% 43.8% 28.6% 44.6 39.9 
 accountants 85.9% 90.8% 32.7% 39.5% 43.6 36.4 
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Table 1b gives some of the demographic attributes of these groups in both surveys, and 
Table 1c shows income4, percent living in London, and percent with university degrees. 
There are strong correlations between the distributions by education (.853), age (.837), 
ethnicity (.810), gender (.905), income (.935) and London residency (.838). While the 
                                                          
4
 Income is measured differently between the two surveys: self-reported household net income, in bands, in 
the GBCS, and self reported individual gross and net income in the LFS (ONS 2014 ). 
CEOs, directors, presidents 97.5% 91.4% 20.8% 17.9% 50.8 44.9 
 other senior business 93.5% 91.2% 27.4% 34.1% 43.6 38.6 
 financial intermediaries 89.7% 90.4% 36.8% 29.6% 43.9 38.2 
 journalists 95.9% 91.2% 48.5% 49.3% 40.9 35.8 
 other ns-sec 1 occupations 92.9% 93.0% 31.6% 30.0% 47.3 39.6 
 TOTAL/AVERAGE 89.3% 90.9% 29.7% 30.4% 43.43 38.97 
 Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
0.810 
 
0.905 
 
0.837 
 
        
        
 
Table 1C: London, Income, Degree in 2 Surveys 
 
Percent in London Income Degree 
 
LFS GBCS LFS 
single 
respondents  
GBCS 
all family 
formations 
GBCS LFS GBCS 
scientists 10.7% 12.8% 37136 37337 47928 86.4% 96.7% 
engineers 13.3% 12.4% 38854 44261 51237 47.9% 83.5% 
IT professionals 21.9% 19.9% 43188 45390 54592 62.2% 78.2% 
doctors 17.2% 17.8% 59615 57699 78221 94.6% 98.7% 
other medical professionals 19.4% 12.0% 36689 44991 56699 91.7% 99.5% 
higher education teachers 25.0% 10.1% 44336 43049 62640 94.3% 99.3% 
education professionals 11.9% 12.3% 41731 41581 57902 75.5% 95.6% 
lawyers, barristers, judges 36.5% 39.6% 54949 68181 79436 92.2% 97.5% 
public sector (outside health) 12.0% 14.2% 39726 46190 53163 57.7% 80.3% 
accountants 22.8% 21.7% 44793 53649 59118 62.6% 83.8% 
CEOs, directors, presidents 29.3% 23.9% 65166 76594 93881 69.7% 72.5% 
other senior business 17.2% 26.1% 43800 52140 63086 48.1% 80.9% 
financial intermediaries 27.5% 28.2% 46165 65723 74130 46.8% 74.8% 
journalists 42.2% 41.0% 37582 42274 50168 79.2% 91.7% 
other ns-sec 1 occupations 23.8% 19.8% 38135 47064 57017 55.9% 83.1% 
TOTAL/AVERAGE 21.4% 22.2% 43777 52549 63758 60.1% 83.3% 
Pearson Correlation Coefficient 
 
0.838 
 
0.935 0.944 
 
0.853 
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overall averages differ (the GBCS is much more educated, younger, and reports far higher 
incomes than the population as a whole), the relationship between age, gender, 
education, income and occupation is fairly similar across the two populations: CEOs 
comfortably earn the most in both surveys, for example, and the highest percentages of 
journalists live in London.   
There are many ways the self-selected GBCS respondents may differ from the general 
population beyond what we can measure by comparing these two surveys, so we cannot 
know whether the upwardly mobile in these occupations in the population are similar to 
the upwardly mobile we examine in the GBCS.  However, while the non-random sampling 
frame precludes formal statistical inference to the wider population, no other survey 
offers such a large sample of those in individual elite occupations alongside details of their 
social backgrounds and an array of social and cultural indicators. We therefore take the 
pragmatic view that, in the absence of representative data, it remains possible to 
cautiously draw out findings using the GBCS. 
It is important to explain how social mobility into elite occupations is operationalized in 
this article. Social mobility is usually defined by looking at directly comparable variables – 
usually occupational classes - that measure one’s social origin and destination. Here, while 
we are able to measure ‘destination’ using respondents’ self-reported job title, an 
identical measure for ‘origin’ - in terms of individual parental occupation - is not available. 
In order to measure respondents’ occupational origin we rely on the GBCS question asking 
respondents what kind of work the ‘main income earner’ in their household carried out 
when they were 14. The nine possible answer categories to this question were designed to 
map onto the eight major NS-SEC categories.  We have thus coded sets of responses into 
four groups: “traditional professional occupations” and “senior managers and 
administrators” as an approximation to NS-SEC I; “modern professional occupations” and 
“middle or junior managers” as an approximation to NS-SEC II; “clerical and intermediate 
occupations” and “technical and craft occupations” as an approximation to NS-SEC III-V; 
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and “semi-routine manual and  service occupations”, “routine manual and service 
occupations”, and “never worked”5 as an approximation to NS-SEC VI-VIII. On this basis, 
members of elite occupations from the first group are classified as intergenerationally 
“stable”, from the second group as “short-range” upwardly mobile, from the third as 
“mid-range” upwardly mobile, and from the fourth as “long-range” upwardly mobile. This 
operationalisation does not represent an ideal measure of social mobility; in particular, 
the distinction between “traditional professional” and “modern professional” is ill-
defined, and child-reported parental occupation is likely to lead to a certain amount of 
measurement error. However, this categorization represented the best available means of 
investigating the major fault lines of mobility into elite occupations. 
 
Results     
Mobility within British elite occupations 
Table 2 shows the social origins of respondents in each of our 15 elite occupational groups 
(marked in italics) within the GBCS.  This demonstrates that respondents in nearly all elite 
occupations are disproportionately drawn from higher managerial and professional 
backgrounds. While 35% of the overall GBCS sample comes from such backgrounds, the 
figure among those in elite occupations is almost always considerably higher, up to 55% 
for doctors. It is also notable that less than 10% of those in any of these elite groups has 
come from a routine, semi-routine occupational background or had parents who never 
worked (compared to 14% of the overall GBCS sample). Moreover, Table 2 also represents 
an unusually detailed investigation of how rates of mobility vary between these elite 
occupational groups and even between individual occupational titles.   
Table 2: Class Origins Within Various Elite Occupations 
                                                          
5
 There may be an argument for excluding those whose parents never worked, as some of these may have 
been living on inherited wealth rather than receiving benefits; the group is small, however (293 people, 
which is 0.73% of our 40,077 in elite occupations).  
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Total 
 
42.0 30.4 17.7 9.9 40,077 
       2211. Medical practitioners 1.2 55.1 27.1 11.6 6.2 1,426 
       lawyers, barristers, judges 
 
52.7 27.5 12.9 6.9 1,929 
2412. Barristers and judges 1.2 55.2 26.5 12.0 6.3 366 
2413. Solicitors 1.2 52.2 27.6 13.7 6.5 1,316 
2419. Legal professionals n.e.c. 1.2 51.4 28.7 10.1 9.7 247 
       1115. Chief executives and senior officials 1.1 52.2 24.7 15.1 8.0 4,319 
       2421. Chartered and certified accountants 1.2 49.4 21.9 17.0 11.7 1,261 
       financial intermediaries 
 
47.2 24.7 18.5 9.7 
 
3532. Brokers 1.2 53.8 23.8 15.2 7.2 277 
1131. Financial managers and directors 1.1 49.1 21.1 19.8 10.1 974 
3534. Finance and investment analysts and advisers 2 42.0 30.0 17.9 10.1 703 
  
    
 other ns-sec 1 occupations 
 
43.2 28.6 18.8 9.4 
 
2434. Chartered surveyors 1.2 51.8 21.9 17.2 9.1 407 
3535. Taxation experts 1.2 51.6 25.0 16.0 7.4 244 
2431. Architects 1.2 47.5 29.0 16.0 7.5 438 
3512. Aircraft pilots and flight engineers 1.2 44.9 27.6 17.4 10.2 98 
1116. Elected officers and representatives 1.2 40.0 27.3 21.8 10.9 55 
3533. Insurance underwriters 1.2 40.0 29.8 20.0 10.2 205 
2444. Clergy 1.2 38.0 32.8 18.5 10.7 271 
1251. Property, housing and estate managers 1.1 37.6 28.6 21.2 12.5 311 
2142. Environment professionals 1.2 37.4 35.0 20.7 6.9 203 
2463. Environmental health professionals 1.2 25.0 31.7 33.3 10.0 60 
  
    
 scientists 
 
42.4 28.2 19.0 10.4 1,991 
2113. Physical scientists 1.2 45.5 30.8 17.5 6.3 286 
2119. Natural and social science professionals n.e.c. 1.2 44.0 27.6 17.9 10.5 987 
2111. Chemical scientists 1.2 40.5 22.2 25.4 11.9 126 
2112. Biological scientists and biochemists 1.2 39.8 26.9 19.9 13.4 387 
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2114. Social and humanities scientists 1.2 37.1 33.7 20.5 8.8 205 
  
    
 other senior business
 
42.3 30.7 17.0 10.0 9,746 
1134. Advertising and public relations directors 1.1 56.6 31.6 10.5 1.3 76 
1132. Marketing and sales directors 1.1 51.1 25.4 15.4 8.1 749 
2425. Actuaries, economists and statisticians 1.2 50.0 28.9 14.4 6.7 492 
2150. Research and development managers 1.2 42.4 31.0 19.0 7.6 516 
2423. Management consultants and business analysts 1.2 41.8 31.9 16.7 9.5 2,138 
1121. Production managers and directors in manufacturing 1.1 41.5 26.5 18.9 13.1 886 
3545. Sales accounts and business development managers 1.2 41.1 31.4 17.4 10.1 1,814 
2424. Business and financial project management professionals 1.2 40.8 31.4 17.8 9.9 544 
2426. Business and related research professionals 1.2 40.6 34.1 15.0 10.3 1,209 
1135. Human resource managers and directors 1.1 40.4 30.3 20.0 9.3 465 
1133. Purchasing managers and directors 1.1 40.4 28.9 16.5 14.2 260 
2429. Business, research and administrative professionals n.e.c. 2 38.7 33.9 16.9 10.6 445 
1122. Production managers and directors in construction 2 32.1 24.4 22.1 21.4 131 
1123. Production managers and directors in mining and energy 1.1 28.6 33.3 28.6 9.5 21 
  
    
 engineers
 
41.1 27.0 21.5 10.3 2,668 
2122. Mechanical engineers 1.2 46.1 27.8 18.0 8.2 245 
2127. Production and process engineers 2 45.2 26.3 19.3 9.2 228 
2121. Civil engineers 1.2 44.4 26.1 20.0 9.6 345 
2124. Electronics engineers 1.2 42.0 23.5 27.2 7.4 81 
2129. Engineering professionals n.e.c. 1.2 40.6 27.2 21.4 10.7 1,285 
2123. Electrical engineers 1.2 35.8 22.0 30.3 11.9 109 
2126. Design and development engineers 1.2 35.5 29.3 23.2 12.0 375 
  
    
 2311. Higher education teaching professionals 1.2 38.6 30.9 19.9 10.7 713 
  
    
 other medical professions
 
38.1 35.6 17.1 9.2 734 
2216. Veterinarians 1.2 55.4 34.9 7.2 2.4 83 
2213. Pharmacists 1.2 44.3 31.7 16.5 7.6 237 
2215. Dental practitioners 1.2 43.6 31.6 17.3 7.5 133 
2212. Psychologists 1.2 37.9 34.8 18.5 8.8 227 
2223. Speech and language therapists 1.2 24.1 38.9 25.9 11.1 54 
  
    
 2471. Journalists, newspaper and periodical editors 2 35.9 42.3 13.4 8.4 1,134 
  
    
 Public Sector (other than health)
 
33.7 35.7 18.3 12.2 839 
1171. Officers in armed forces 1.1 39.6 36.0 14.9 9.6 303 
2432. Town planning officers 1.2 35.3 37.6 14.7 12.4 218 
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1173. Senior officers in fire, ambulance, prison and related services 1.1 
29.1 34.6 18.2 18.2 
55 
1181. Health services and public health managers and directors 1.1 28.3 35.9 22.8 13.0 92 
1184. Social services managers and directors 1.1 27.9 27.9 27.9 16.4 61 
2443. Probation officers 1.2 24.5 34.7 22.5 18.4 49 
1172. Senior police officers 1.1 16.4 37.7 36.1 9.8 61 
  
    
 education professionals
 
32.0 34.4 20.7 12.9 1,401 
2317. Senior professionals of educational establishments 1.2 32.4 33.9 20.8 12.9 1,229 
2318. Education advisers and school inspectors 1.2 29.1 38.4 19.8 12.8 172 
  
    
 IT professionals
 
32.0 36.6 20.0 11.4 7,672 
1136. Information technology and telecommunications directors 2 40.1 26.3 22.6 11.1 217 
2133. IT specialist managers 1.2 33.9 34.7 19.0 12.3 1,373 
2139. Information technology and telecommunications professionals 
n.e.c. 2 
33.0 36.1 21.4 9.5 
1,408 
2136. Programmers and software development professionals 1.2 31.8 38.2 18.8 11.2 2,914 
2135. IT business analysts, architects and systems designers 1.2 29.2 34.8 21.8 14.2 965 
2137. Web design and development professionals 2 28.6 40.0 20.4 11.0 618 
2134. IT project and programme managers 1.2 27.1 40.1 21.5 11.3 177 
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Table 2 illustrates that the social origins of those in different elite occupations vary 
considerably. For example, while 55% of doctors are the children of higher managers and 
professionals, only 16% of senior police officers have similarly privileged roots. Table 3 
also suggests a distinction within elite occupations between the traditional and/or 
managerial and the technical and/or emerging (Savage, 1992). For example, there appears 
to be a more traditional - even ‘gentlemanly’ (Miles and Savage, 2012) – set of professions 
in the form of law, medicine and sections of the business world, which have a particularly 
high concentration of those from privileged backgrounds. Over half of solicitors, 
barristers, judges, veterinaries, doctors, chartered surveyors, CEOs, and stockbrokers 
come from backgrounds where the main parental earner was in higher managerial or 
professional employment whereas less than 8% from each group has parents in semi-
routine or routine occupations. In contrast, we can identify a set of technical professions 
in the form of IT managers, computer programmers, web designers, podiatrists, speech 
and language therapists and medical radiographers, which are noticeably more diverse in 
terms of social origin. We can therefore say that not only do the origins and recruitment 
profiles of those in elite occupations vary, indicating tentative support for a microclass 
position, but also they vary in ways that betray a strong historical precedent (Miles, 1999; 
Heath, 1981) 
Finally, such granular analysis also shows interesting lines of differentiation within similar 
occupational categories. For example, Table 3 indicates that there is considerably fewer 
design and development engineers from NS-SEC 1 backgrounds than is the case for civic, 
mechanical or production and process engineers. These findings suggest that even some 
‘micro-class’ occupational groupings such as ‘engineers’ (Grusky et al, 2008) may still be 
too broad; in other words, there may be important distinctions in the amount of social 
reproduction or mobility even within such groups.  
 
The Limits of Capital Gains within the Mobile Elite  
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While Table 2 describes the distribution of social origins among GBCS respondents in 
different elite occupations, it does not tell us how those from lower social origins fare 
relative to others within these elite occupations. As mentioned in the introduction, we are 
particularly interested in investigating whether the upwardly mobile are less likely to 
achieve the highest levels of seniority and success. In this section, we therefore 
investigate whether stocks of economic, cultural and social capital differ among those in 
elite occupations from different social origins.6  
Before doing this, it is briefly worth outlining our measurement of these capitals. In terms 
of cultural capital, we use two measures. Following Savage et al’s (2013) example, we first 
measure cultural capital in terms of engagement with ‘legitimate culture’ (i.e classical 
music, attending stately homes, museums, art galleries, jazz, theatre, and French 
restaurants)7. However, using a more conventional Bourdieusian (1984) frame, we also 
look at cultural capital in terms of educational attainment - specifically whether 
respondents have or haven’t attended university. In terms of social capital we use 
questions based on the Lin position generator (Lin & Dumin 1986; Lin, Fu, and Hsung 
2001), which ask whether the respondent knows someone socially in each of 34 
occupations. Each of these are scored with the widely validated Cambridge Social 
Interaction and Stratification (CAMSIS) scale, and we then use the mean status score of 
respondent’s social contacts as our measure of social capital for this paper. And for 
economic capital, we look at three measures assessing household income, household 
savings, and house price. Finally, we also look at whether a respondent had been 
educated at an independent school and whether they have attended Oxford or Cambridge 
universities. While neither a private education nor Oxbridge attendance represents a form 
                                                          
6
 In this way we can in part address one of the shortcomings of work on elite recruitment associated with 
‘closure thesis’ as identified by Goldthorpe; namely, the failure to distinguish between elite occupations and 
elites within those occupations (Goldthorpe 1987: 46). 
7
 Rather than assuming a priori that certain culture is more ‘highbrow’ than others, Savage et al (2013) 
carried out an inductive analysis of cultural taste using multiple correspondence analysis (MCA) in order to 
assess the structuring of cultural divisions in Britain. 
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of capital per se, a wealth of research has pointed out how such institutions act as key 
incubators in the cultivation of both social and cultural capital (Khan, 2011; Reay 2009).   
In Table 3 we demonstrate how the capital scores of all respondents from our extended 
Elite occupational group vary according to their social origin.  This shows that stocks of 
cultural, social and economic capital are all higher among those from higher professional 
and managerial backgrounds. Beginning with cultural capital, Table 3 shows that those 
from privileged backgrounds tend to engage more in highbrow culture and are more likely 
to have a degree than respondents who have been upwardly socially mobile. It also 
illustrates that they are more likely to have benefited from elite educational pathways, 
with a considerably higher proportion educated privately and/or attending Oxford or 
Cambridge Universities. In terms of social capital they also have higher status social 
contacts. Finally, in terms of economic capital, Table 3 illustrates that those 
intergenerationally stable in elite occupations have on average £12,000 more in savings 
than their mobile counterparts, their houses are worth at least £33,000 more on average, 
and their average incomes are between £11k and £15k higher. 
Table 3: Capitals by Origin in Occupational Elite 
 
Senior 
Managers 
& 
Traditional 
Professions 
Lower 
Managers 
& Modern 
Professions 
Intermediate 
& Technical 
Occupations 
Manual 
& 
Never-
Worked 
average 
all in 
elite 
occs 
average income 71,090 60,277 56,955 56,228 63,834 
average savings 58,085 45,574 46,956 44,558 50,975 
average house value 243,883 209,707 211,894 200,505 223,545 
score on legitimate cultural participation  14.3 13.5 13.1 12.7 13.7 
average score of contacts  55.1 53.2 51.0 49.5 53.3 
went to independent/fee-paying school 33% 17% 9% 7% 22% 
attended Oxford or Cambridge 11% 8% 4% 4% 8% 
has undergraduate degree (or more) 87% 84% 77% 75% 83% 
N 16,841 12,200 7,079 3,959 40,077 
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Some of these differences in capitals are most likely evidence of direct intergenerational 
transfer. For example, it may be that the greater savings and more valuable homes of the 
stable are the direct result of inheritance and/or informal ‘gifting’ of economic capital 
from parents who, because of their own occupational position, have greater economic 
resources (Piketty, 2014). Similarly, parents in higher managerial and professional 
employment are likely to have higher status contacts and more legitimate tastes 
themselves, which in turn they can directly pass on to their children (Bourdieu, 1996). Yet 
processes of direct transfer or inheritance cannot explain the considerable differences in 
income demonstrated in Table 3: within elite occupations the upwardly mobile earn less 
than those from intergenerationally stable backgrounds. It is to this key problematic that 
we now turn.  
 
Unpacking the Income Disparity  
One possible explanation for the income difference highlighted in Table 3 is that 
respondents whose parents worked in manual or semi-manual occupations are in less 
well-paid sectors within our set of elite occupations; Table 4, however, shows that there 
are income differences by origin across almost all occupations we have included in our 
analysis.  The origins-differential in income among GBCS respondents in elite occupations 
ranges from around £5,000 for doctors to £24,000 for financial intermediaries.  This is not 
simply a function of the range of incomes in these occupations: for example, doctors have 
among the highest average household income in our sample (at £78k) but among the 
lowest differentials between high- and low-origin respondents; higher education teachers 
have much lower average incomes but a £13k differential. Table 4 shows that there are 
meaningful differences in all of the occupation groups, and that the size of these 
differences varies substantially across different kinds of elite occupations.   
Table 4: Average Income by Occupation Group & Origin 
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stable vs 
long-
range 
difference 
Senior 
Managers 
& 
Traditional 
Professions 
Lower 
Managers 
& Modern 
Professions 
Intermediate 
& Technical 
Occupations 
Manual & 
Never-
Worked 
average 
in all 
elite 
occs 
financial intermediaries 24,030 84,797 68,843 60,942 60,767 74,130 
lawyers, barristers, judges 20,780 86,363 75,273 67,450 65,583 79,436 
CEOs, directors, presidents 17,585 101,052 87,751 84,606 83,467 93,881 
higher education teachers 13,264 68,264 61,534 57,553 55,000 62,640 
other senior business 11,990 68,668 61,081 57,437 56,678 63,233 
IT professionals 11,437 61,899 53,770 50,301 50,462 55,296 
accountants 10,858 63,848 57,237 52,009 52,990 59,118 
other ns-sec 1 occupations 10,006 59,417 51,678 51,306 49,411 54,738 
public sector (outside 
health) 
8,605 57,946 50,131 52,810 49,341 53,163 
engineers 7,512 55,066 49,678 47,648 47,554 51,237 
journalists 6,981 53,876 48,958 46,102 46,895 50,168 
other medical professionals 6,688 60,617 57,266 60,262 53,929 58,924 
scientists 6,611 50,790 45,740 46,832 44,179 47,928 
doctors 5,311 80,226 78,925 68,840 74,915 78,221 
education professionals 3,335 60,324 57,012 56,207 56,989 57,901 
 
Strikingly, Table 4 also shows that the origin effect does not correspond to the mobility 
flows expressed in Table 2. For example, while doctors in our sample are the most likely to 
have come from privileged backgrounds, their average incomes are relatively evenly 
spread regardless of social background. In contrast IT has the lowest proportion of 
intergenerationally stable respondents, but the upwardly mobile earn an average of £11k 
less than those from more privileged backgrounds. More generally, among lawyers, CEOs, 
and financial intermediaries income differences by origin are particularly pronounced; 
financial intermediaries from higher managerial and professional backgrounds earn on 
average £24k more than those from routine and semi-routine backgrounds.  While this 
points in the direction of disadvantage for the upwardly mobile in many elite occupations, 
it gives few hints about why we see these income penalties. 
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In order to disentangle some sources of these class-origin income differences, we 
conducted a series of ordinary least squares regression analyses8.  Table 5 shows the 
results of a series of regressions on income among the individuals we categorized as 
having ‘elite’ occupations (N = 38,973; respondents with missing values on one or more of 
the variables in the model were excluded from all models).  Model 1 shows a simple base 
model where household income is predicted by the respondent’s education (more or less 
than an undergraduate degree, with undergraduate degree the reference group), 
race/ethnicity (whites as reference group), gender (men as reference group), NS-SEC 
category (higher managers as reference group), age, region (London and the Southeast vs 
the rest of the UK) and whether or not they are living with a partner (those without live-in 
partners as the reference group).   All of these are strongly associated with household 
income, and serve as controls in the next three models. Adding the respondents’ class 
origin to the model shows that origins strongly predict income even net a ‘London effect,’ 
age differences, and differences in educational qualifications; those whose parents were 
not traditional professionals or higher managers have incomes between £8178 and 
£10,760/year lower than otherwise-similar people in other elite occupations. 
Table 5: Regression of Income for All in Elite Occupations 
 
1 2 3 4 
Education (vs undergraduate degree) 
    Postgraduate degree 4645 4140 3017 768 
A-levels or less education -8367 -7552 -4997 -1101 
NS-SEC (vs 1.1) 
    Higher Professionals (ns-sec 1.2) -19337 -18460 -18231 -16998 
lower managers - (ns-sec 2) -23440 -22132 -21673 -19810 
age 117 143 158 30 
partnered 17549 17546 17892 16930 
not white 256 138 -95 -14 
female -4522 -4658 -4299 -6338 
Region (vs rest of UK) 
    London 23302 22391 20498 16927 
Southeast 10523 10029 9479 8067 
                                                          
8
 Since formal statistical inference is not possible we do not include measures of statistical significance.  
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Parents (vs Higher Mgmt & Trad Profs) 
    modern prof or lower mgmt 
 
-8178 -6517 -5191 
technical or intermediate 
 
-10721 -7997 -4863 
routine, semi-routine, never worked 
 
-10760 -7801 -3164 
University Attended (versus all others) 
    Oxford or Cambridge 
  
9570 5732 
Any Other Russell Group 
  
4412 2470 
Private/Fee-Paying school 
  
9507 6795 
legitimate cultural participation (cultural capital) 
   
23879 
mean of contacts' scores (social capital) 
   
77323 
constant 69475 73564 54550 3599 
     N 38973 38973 38973 38973 
r2 0.134 0.146 0.159 0.194 
adjusted r2 0.134 0.146 0.158 0.193 
 
Next we add two types of elite schooling: having attended a private/fee-paying school, 
and having attended Oxford or Cambridge, or one of the other Russell Group universities. 
Both of these strongly and substantively predict income; respondents who attended 
private schools have on average £9570 more income than those who are otherwise similar 
but did not; those who attended Oxbridge have £9507 more than those who attended 
non-Russell Group institutions. Further, it appears that some of the advantage in earnings 
for those from senior manager/traditional professional families operates through elite 
education: the coefficients for coming from lower-status occupation households are each 
reduced by around £1500 – £3000 when education is added to the model.   
In Model 4, we add the measures of cultural and social capital (both transformed to range 
from 0 to 1).  While origins and schooling are clearly prior to current income, these 
capitals are associated both with current status and origins, so it is not necessarily 
surprising that they have large associations with income.  What is important to emphasize, 
however, is that while the coefficients for origins shrink substantially with addition of 
these capital measures to the model, they do not by any means disappear.  This strongly 
implies that while some of the income disparity we see may be the effect of cultural and 
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social capitals, these capitals (or at least our measures of them) do not explain the entire 
difference between the upwardly mobile and the children of upper professionals and 
managers. There are still considerable (nearly £3200-£5200) differences in annual 
household income by origins, even when a slew of other factors are held constant9.   
 
Figure 1: Coefficients in Regressions of Income within Occupational Groups 
 
                                                          
9
 We did a number of robustness checks of these models, using different specifications for university 
attended and educational qualifications, and looking at women, singles, and ethnic minorities in separate 
regressions.  The coefficients for women and ethnic minorities are substantively identical to those for the 
whole elite group; the coefficients for singles are substantially larger, likely because the ‘noise’ of partners’ 
contributions to household income has been eliminated. 
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Finally, we repeated the regressions in Models 2 and 4 within each of our 15 individual 
occupational groups. Where more than one SOC 2010 code is grouped together, we also 
include dummy variables for particular occupations within the group. For ease of 
presentation and interpretation, we recoded the origin variable into only two categories, 
those from senior management and higher professional families (NS-SEC 1) versus 
everyone else.  In Figure 1, we present only the coefficients for this origin variable: black 
dots indicate coefficients from the full model; grey dots for the simpler model. The full 
table of results is in Appendix 1.  
In all but two occupational groups (doctors and other medical professionals), the 
coefficient for less-than-NS-SEC-1 origins is negative in both models. At the left of the 
figure, the estimated origin effects in the full models for medical professionals, doctors, 
education professionals, engineers, scientists, and higher education teachers are close to 
or less than £2000/year, and so it seems that there are either small or no disparities in by 
origins in these occupations once various forms of capital are taken into account. 
However, at the far right of the figure the differences in income by origin are much larger, 
so at least among our respondents it is clear that non-NS-SEC-1 origins are a disadvantage 
in law, accountancy, IT, CEOs, and finance10.   
Generally speaking, then, the health and education fields seem to minimally disadvantage 
the upwardly mobile, controlling for schooling and capital composition, while the more 
highly paid business world (along with IT) seems much more likely to penalize those from 
less-advantaged backgrounds, all else being equal. Across these occupations, therefore, 
there is good reason to believe there is a ‘class ceiling’ for people from lower-status 
occupational origins. Even when we control for schooling, education, age, and capital 
volume, we find that these respondents have considerably lower incomes than their 
higher-origin colleagues. 
                                                          
10
 While the coefficient for public sector occupations is similar in size to these other occupations, the 
relatively small N for this group makes us less confident. 
26 
 
Of course, it is not possible to know exactly how these origin effects are happening. These 
differences may be mediated by the different working practices, pay structures, and 
occupational cultures in the public versus the private sector. Alternatively, where there 
are wide intra-occupation disparities it could be that lower-origin respondents are in less-
prestigious and therefore lower paying firms or institutions, or that they are paid less even 
within the same firms.  We can rule out, though, that this is a homogamy effect (the 
coefficients when we look only at single people are even larger), that it is related to 
residency in London, or that differences in income are simply the effect of differences in 
schooling or network.  If we are not willing to assume that people from lower-status 
backgrounds simply work less hard, the case for lingering, unfair disadvantage by class 
origin in the GBCS is strong.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper we have utilized the unusually large sample size of the Great British Class 
Survey to examine rates of upward mobility into Britain’s elite occupations. We have also 
investigated whether a class ceiling may prevent those who are upwardly mobile from 
accruing the very highest levels of economic, cultural and social capital. We believe this 
analysis represents a valuable and innovative contribution to understandings of social 
mobility in Britain, particularly considering the limited focus (on mobility rates into 
generalized classes) that underpins the majority of mobility research.  
However, we must also reiterate the limitations of using a self-selecting web survey like 
the GBCS. Because of the much higher levels of participation by the highly educated, those 
living in London and those in professional and managerial employment, we cannot use 
these data to make inferences about the distributions or general characteristics of these 
occupations in the population.  However, we have no reason to suspect that the people 
who responded to the survey have different sets of relationships among their attributes 
than do non-respondents; i.e., we think it is unlikely that the patterns we see are solely 
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the result of selection bias. It is theoretically possible, but farfetched, to suggest that our 
results are driven by a disproportionately large response from upwardly mobile 
respondents who are underpaid compared to intergenerationally stable colleagues within 
their occupations. Proceeding from this position, we believe three tentative but 
potentially significant conclusions can be drawn from our analysis.   
First, the GBCS data point to clear lines of variation in the social composition of different 
elite occupations. For example, there is a distinction between ‘traditional’ professions, 
such as law, medicine and finance, which are dominated by the children of higher 
managers and professionals, and more technical and emergent occupations, particularly 
those related to IT,  that recruit more widely. We see this internal differentiation as 
further supporting the wider argument put forward in this Special Issue that elites in 
contemporary Britain are far from a cohesive formation.   
Second, the article demonstrates that even when the upwardly mobile are successful in 
entering elite occupations they are not accumulating the same resources of economic, 
cultural and social capital as those from privileged backgrounds. They have - on average - 
less savings, less valuable homes, lower status contacts, and are less engaged in legitimate 
culture. One plausible driver for such differences may be the intergenerational 
transmission of valuable resources (material and symbolic) from higher managers and 
professionals to their children.  
However, third, we also find that the mobile tend to have considerably lower incomes, a 
finding more difficult to explain via processes of transmission or inheritance. Investigating 
this finding further, we demonstrate that this origins-differential in earnings again varies 
considerably according to different elite occupations, but not in line with the class origin 
composition of those occupations. Some of the professions with the smallest proportion 
of upwardly mobile incumbents have the lowest income differentials while more diverse 
and open occupations have greater income penalties.   
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Finally and perhaps most significantly we demonstrate that even when controlling for 
important variables such as schooling, education, location, age, and cultural and social 
capital, the upwardly mobile in our sample have lower incomes than their higher-origin 
colleagues.  This is true in a range of elite occupations, and particularly in IT, finance, 
accounting and among CEOs. 
A number of mechanisms may be at work to produce this relative disadvantage. Here we 
suggest three possibilities, all of which warrant further enquiry. First, it may be that the 
career trajectories (and subsequent incomes) of the upwardly mobile are hampered by 
their relative lack of more embodied forms of cultural capital, which are not captured by 
our measure of participation in legitimate culture.  This kind of cultural competence is 
hard to simply ‘acquire’ and instead inextricably linked to dispositions inherited by 
children from more privileged backgrounds (Bourdieu, 1986; Friedman, 2012). Moreover, 
while it may be notoriously difficult to discern via survey measures, this kind of resource 
may nevertheless be highly important in structuring how upwardly mobile individuals are 
evaluated within elite occupations (Rivera, 2012) or how they feel about their own value 
within occupational environments (Friedman, 2013). Second, it may be that the upwardly 
mobile do not always desire to reach the top in the same way as those from privileged 
backgrounds. For example, a wealth of qualitative research (Reay, 1997, Skeggs, 1997; 
Lawler, 1999) suggests that upward mobility may not be something that everyone 
unequivocally aspires to, and is often associated with an anxiety over betraying or 
abandoning one’s class-cultural origins. Finally, it may be that the upwardly mobile are 
simply the victims of class discrimination: that they are either consciously or 
unconsciously given fewer rewards in the workplace than those from more advantaged 
backgrounds.  
Further research is necessary to untangle these complex mechanisms of disadvantage. In 
the meantime, the broader implications of our findings for the apparent paradox that lies 
at the heart of mobility studies are more immediately clear. Here, while sociologists have 
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argued that rates of occupational mobility have remained largely stable in Britain over the 
last 30 years, economists have arrived at the contradictory conclusion that income 
mobility is in steady decline; this, despite the fact that income is clearly linked to 
occupation. However, our finding that there are marked income disparities between 
internally recruited and upwardly mobile groups in many elite occupations is more 
suggestive of the limitation imposed by the categories, combinations and levels of analysis 
employed by the respective protagonists in the debate. In this way of thinking, the 
patterns of class stability and income mobility reflected in competing aggregate studies of 
mobility are, in fact, part of the same process, and one which is only detectable by 
returning to an older tradition in mobility studies and working at the level of 
disaggregated occupational analysis. 
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Appendix 1: Full regression models for figure 1 (does not show coefficients for individual occupations within groups) 
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Appendix 2: Origins, N & Percents across our 15 groups 
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